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Abstract
Cultural observers like Ramanujan and Max Muller have 
implied that untruthfulness amongst Indians is prevalent because 
o f its approval by ancient behaviour codes. Ramanujan also 
attributed a lack o f universality in Indian thought to the same 
codes. While the ancient codes contain many assertions we would 
consider problematic today, lack o f universality is not one o f 
them as fa r as preference fo r truthfulness is concerned. The only 
occasion wherein any o f the ancient codes prefer lies to truth is 
when someone's life was at stake. The quantitative prevalence o f 
untruthfulness in different groups can only be empirically 
estimated by carefully designed questionnaires or experimentally. 
To minimize getting answers that the respondents will assume are 
expected o f them, the first investigations should deal with 
instances o f petty untruthfulness, where the consequences are 
trivial.
I. The charges cited by Ramanujan
In an essay brimming with insights, A. K. Ramanujan 
(1999) cites three common observations of the Indian way 
of thinking: inconsistency, an apparent inability to 
distinguish self from non-self, and a lack of universality. 
These criticisms have been levelled not only by foreigners 
but also by many modern Indian intellectuals as well. 
Inconsistency is revealed by being unbothered by 
simultaneous incompatible beliefs, as in astronomy and 
astrology. Alongside this charge of inconsistency, 
Ramanujan cites also the charge of hypocrisy— "Indians 
do not mean what they say and say different things at 
different times". On the lack of universality in Indian 
thought, this is what Ramanujan has to say:
One has only to read Manu after a bit of Kant 
to be struck by the former's lack of 
universality. He seems to have no clear notion 
of a universal human nature from which one 
can deduce ethical decrees like 'Man shall not 
kill', or 'Man shall not tell an untruth'. One is 
aware of no notion of a 'state', no unitary law 
of all men . . .
Ramanujan goes on to quote from Max Muller's second 
lecture to the students of Cambridge University.
Even truth-telling is not an unconditional 
imperative, as Muller's correspondents 
discovered.
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An untruth spoken by people under the 
influence of anger, excessive joy, fear, pain, or 
grief, by infants, by very old men, by persons 
labouring under a delusion, being under the 
influence of drink, or by mad men, does not 
cause the speaker to fall, or as we should say, 
is a venial not a mortal sin. (Gautama
paraphrased in Muller, 1883, 70). Alexander 
Wilder adds, in a footnote, further extensions:
"At the time of marriage, during dalliance,
when life is in danger, when loss of property is
threatened, and for the sake of a Brahmana . .
. Manu declared . . . whenever the death of a 
man of any of the four castes would be
occasioned by true evidence, falsehood was 
even better than truth. (Muller 1883, 89)."
In answer to these criticisms, Ramanujan showed 
effectively how the dominant cultural tendency in India 
seems to favour context-specific systems, and the lack of 
distinction between self and not-self (or between nature 
and culture) is intentional and stems from a refusal to see 
things in black and white, from a preference for 
continuums, and may sometimes be a source of vision and 
strength. While Ramanujan was masterful in refuting the 
arguments put forward by the critics, he was more or less 
silent on his asides on untruthfulness, implying that the 
refutation had been provided by Max Muller. Again to 
quote:
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In Max Muller's lectures on India (1883), the 
second chapter was called 'Truthful character 
of the Hindus', in answer to many complaints.
The Ramanujan essay leaves a reader with the 
impression that untruthfulness' amongst Indians is 
prevalent widely because of its sanction by the ancient 
Indian code-givers. In the following four sections, I 
summarize what Max Muller and the ancient code-givers 
had to say on the subject of untruthful behaviour.
II. Max Muller's Defence
The Max Muller lectures were delivered in 1882 to a 
group of English students at Cambridge University 
considering taking the competitive examination for the 
Indian Civil Service. In the second lecture titled "Truthful 
Character of the Hindus", Max Muller's stated intention 
was to remove the prejudice that Hindus are "totally 
different from ourselves in their moral character, and more
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' Ii would be useful fiist  lo d is tinguish b e tw een hypocrisy,  
in co ns is ten cy  and untruthl'ulness. Say in g  on e  thing w hile  b e liev in g  
another is the usual defin it ion  o f  hypocrisy.  S ay in g  d if ferent  things at 
d if ferent  t im es in s im ilar  situations,  w hile  b e in g  inco ns is ten t ,  d oes  not 
au to m atica lly  co n n o te  untruthfuiness. W h e n  either  o f  tw o op p osin g  
e xp lan atio n s  will  do for an o th erw ise  in ex p licab le  event,  c h o o s in g  
different  exp lan atio n s  at d if ferent  l im es  for s im ilar  events  is at best  
m erely  a matter o f  co n v e n ie n c e ,  or at worst, a re f lect ion  o f  c l ich c -ed  
thinking. T h u s  when vil lagers ch o o s e  alternately  e ith er  karma or 
u i l a i r id i  ( fa te )  to explain  s im ila r  even ts  around them, they are not be in g  
untruthful, ju s t  p icking on e  o f  the two p o ss ib le  e xp lan atio n s  at random. 
I f  co nfron ted ,  they could  Just as easi ly  c h o o s e  the other. F or  a statement 
to be untruthful, the intention to mislead is crucial.
particularly in what forms the very foundation of the 
English character, respect for truth." He goes on to say 
that "it has become an article of faith with every Indian 
Civil servant that all Indians are liars; nay, I know, I shall 
never be forgiven for venturing to doubt it." Again, "so 
often has the charge of untruthfulness been repeated, and 
so generally is it now accepted, that it seems Quixotic to 
try and fight against it."
Max Muller did a remarkable job in "selling" India to 
Cambridge students. He also succeeded in helping many 
Indians to think well of their cultural heritage; his book of 
lectures sold more copies in India than it did in England. 
Muller had never visited India and had to rely on written 
sources and hearsay to make his case in these lectures. 
However, when it comes to defending 'Hindus' (in those 
days the word Hindus was also applied to include Sikhs, 
Parsees, Buddhists, etc.) against the charge of 
untruthfulness, he displays a queer ambivalence. While he 
provides many quotes that Indians/Hindus have several 
admirable qualities, whenever he makes too spirited a 
defence of their truthfulness, he feels compelled to give— 
not equal time, but mention a qualification or an 
opposing point of view that diminishes, if not 
undermines, the defence. It is instructive to go through 
his arguments.
The first concession he makes is that "some hundreds, 
say even some thousands of Indians, when they are 
brought before an English court of law, on suspicion of
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having committed a theft or murder, do not speak the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." He 
then goes on to say that an English sailor would do the 
same if brought before a foreign judge.
Indians were more likely to lie in an English court, 
Max Muller argued, because the courts were located in 
towns and a man taken out of his village community was 
removed from all restraints of society and public opinion. 
Muller quotes approvingly the reply Colonel Sleeman 
received from an Indian lawyer in the eighteen thirties 
when asked about the impact of replacing an oath on the 
Koran or Ganges water by a solemn declaration made in 
the name of God. With characteristic proficiency, the 
Indian lawyer classified witnesses into three groups (see 
Table 1 below).
Table 1: Impact of Oaths on the Truthfulness of 
Indian Witnesses in Colonial Courts
Type of Oath
Groups that will 
testify truthfully
Groups that will 
testify falsely
If under oath on 
the Koran or 
Ganges water
I, II III, (IV)
Under solemn 
declaration in 
the name of God
I. (IV) II, III
The change would have no effect on two groups of 
witnesses, those who will tell the truth regardless (Group
I) and those who would tell lies whenever they have a 
sufficient motive (Group III). However, he claims that the 
class that is most numerous (Group II) would tell the 
truth under an oath but would lie if asked to testify under 
a solemn declaration. The lawyer however felt that "three- 
fourths of those who do not scruple to lie in the courts 
would be ashamed to tell lies before their neighbours, or 
the elders of their village." (A fourth group of a tiny 
minority that might take perverse pleasure in telling lies 
only when asked to take an oath but told the truth under 
solemn declaration is not discussed.)
After quoting several Greek, Chinese, Arab and 
European travellers who testify about the positive 
qualities of Indians they encountered, Muller quotes Meer 
Salamat Ali that "a Hindu may feel himself authorized to 
take in a Mussulman, and might even think it meritorious 
to do so; but he would never think it meritorious to take 
in one of his own religion." After more adulatory 
passages, he goes on to quote Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
the early IQ*" century Governor of Bombay:
...at present, want of veracity is one of their 
prominent vices. Such deceit is most common 
in people connected with government, a class 
which spreads far in India, as, from the nature 
of land-revenue, the lowest villager is often 
obliged to resist force by fraud.
In the last part of his "defence". Max Muller cites 
Indian sources. "Were I to quote from all the law-books.
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and from still later works, everywhere you would hear the 
same keynote of truthfulness vibrating through them all." 
And again, lest he "should seem to be pleading too much 
on the native side of the question", he admits that "under 
certain circumstances a lie was allowed, or at all events, 
excused by Indian lawgivers." He then quotes Gautama 
that Ramanujan reproduced in his essay.
From all this Max Muller concludes that the character 
of the natives of India is truthful, when left to themselves, 
or at Least was so in ancient times, until about 1000 A.D. 
If one were to add all the exceptions mentioned in the 
lecture it would add up to this: Hindus are truthful except 
when they reside in towns; except on matters of land 
revenue when they reside in villages; except when they 
testify in courts; except when they deal with people of 
other religions; except when they are in government; and 
except when allowed or excused by their ancient code­
givers. Hardly a resounding endorsement that one would 
have expected after reading the dust jacket of a recent 
Indian edition of his book (1991) which says: "On the 
basis of facts and testimonies from Hindu scriptures, 
foreign accounts and Colonel Sleeman's observations, he 
clearly showed the truthful character of the Hindus". The 
editors too must have had doubts though, for the title of 
the second lecture in this Indian edition was changed 
from the original "Truthful Character of the Hindus" to the 
more non-committal "Character of the Hindus".
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III, Ancient Indian Sources of Behaviour Codes
Let us now consider what ancient Indian compilers of 
behaviour codes had to say about truthfulness. In 
addition to the famous code of Manu, there are four other 
surviving codes of proper individual and social behaviour 
as determined by one's age, gender, caste, marital status 
and order of life (Olivelle, 1999). These are the codes 
attributed to Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana, and 
Vasistha. They were followed by Manu Smriti, composed at 
the turn of the Common Era (Doniger, 1991). As is 
common with ancient Indian texts, both the absolute and 
the relative chronologies are shrouded in controversy.
Table 2 below shows that only a small fraction, about 
1.1% on an average (range 0.47o-2.3%) of the sutras in 
these codes deal with statements about truthfulness and 
lying. In every code, the number of sutras that either 
praise truth, or condemn lies, or specify a punishment for 
a lapse, far exceeds the number of sutras that seem to 
condone lies in certain circumstances.
Numbers undoubtedly convey only a partial and 
inadequate picture. One must carefully analyse what the 
sutras say. There are no sutras in Apastamba and 
Baudhayana that specify circumstances where lying is 
condoned. The four sutras in Gautama, 1 in Vasistha and 
the 4 in Manu that fail to condemn lying unequivocally 
are reproduced in Table 3.
The first set (first row in Table 3) specifies 
circumstances when a verbal promise could be broken. For
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Gautama, it could be broken if the request were made for 
unlawful (adharmic) purposes (5.23). For Manu, it was 
enough for the agreement to be outside the bounds of 
justice or outside customary business practice (8.164).
The second set specifies circumstances that reduce 
the culpability of the liar based on his condition at the 
time. Thus for Gautama, there are ten conditions which 
will not cause a person to lose his caste (a very severe 
punishment) when he utters an untrue statement: anger, 
jubilance, fear, pain, greed, feeble-mindedness, 
drunkenness, madness, childhood or old age. The 
corresponding sutra in Manu restricts the validity of, 
contracts if they are made by an unauthorized person or 
someone drunk, crazy, in pain, or totally dependent, or a 
child or an old man (8.163). The first five states 
mentioned by Gautama do not qualify to nullify a contract 
in Manu. Interestingly, none of the codes specifies the 
kind of instances of untruthful behaviour that would cause 
a man to lose his caste.
The third set, the least defensible today, describes 
the types of lies that were not considered criminal or 
sinful. The three codes agree that marriages and sexual 
encounters provide extenuating circumstances for lying. 
They differ in assessing their seriousness. For Gautama, 
they are not sins; for Vasistha, they do not entail loss of 
caste; and for Manu, they are not crimes. Gautama also 
puts lies told in grief and in jest in his listing. Vasistha 
excludes these two, but includes three others:
Dilip Ahuja
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when the person's "life is at stake, when there is a risk of 
losing all his property, and for the sake of a Brahmin." 
Manij agrees with Vasistha on the need for lies if they 
would help a priest, but substitutes for property the 
greatly more trivial circumstances when untrue statements 
would not constitute a crime - in connection with fodder 
for cows and fuel.
The fourth set of circumstances listed by Gautama and 
Manu concern testimony in a case that could lead to 
capital punishment. In such a case, Gautama says it is not 
an offence to give false testimony but not if an evil man 
is being tried. Manu specifies that one should lie if telling 
the truth would cause the death of a servant, commoner, 
ruler or priest. He calls this lying as being better than the 
truth. This is however, the only occasion wherein any o f  the 
ancient code-givers expresses a clear preference fo r  lies over 
truth. Otherwise, the statements are double negatives - 
not a sin, not a sin causing loss of caste, not an offence, 
not A crime, etc. If one were to rank order the three code- 
givers in order of leniency, one would have to choose 
Vasistha, Gautama and Manu in that order.
IV. Positive Features of Ancient Indian Behaviour Codes
Ancient Indian behaviour codes state a general rule 
then follow it up with exceptions (Doniger, 1991). Even in 
Manu, the most "lenient" of the ancient behaviour codes, 
untruthfulness was the not the preferred mode; it was 
preferred only when someone's life was at stake. The
Dilip Ahuja
Alexander Wilder footnote from the Max Muller lectures 
quoted by Ramanujan (on page 3) actually combines a 
sutra from Vasistha (16.36) with one from Manu (8.104) 
as reproduced on page 13, and makes it appear that Manu 
approves lying in more circumstances than he actually did. 
There was universality in ancient Indian behaviour codes, 
at least for truthfulness. Had they confined themselves to 
universal statements, their codes would have been limited 
to a few sutras or commandments. Having made 
statements that favour truthfulness (see next paragraph), 
the code-givers, being pragmatic in the extreme, 
recognize that lapses will occur and largely concern 
themselves with describing those lapses and prescribing 
appropriate punishments or penances.
The texts reveal a preference for truth over lying. 
Baudhayana (Book III, 1.27), Vasistha (3.60) and Manu 
(5.109) concur that "as the body is cleaned by water, the 
intellect is cleaned or purified by knowledge and the mind 
by truth." If this still seems too abstract and non-binding, 
Vasistha (4.4) stipulates that "speaking the truth, 
refraining from anger, giving gifts, not killing living 
creatures and fathering children— these (duties) are 
common to all classes." Similarly, Manu (10.63) specifies, 
"Non-violence, truth, non-stealing, purification and the 
suppression of sensory powers is the duty of the four 
classes, in a nutshell." Only non-violence and truthfulness 
are duties common to both codes. Manu further specifies 
another duty that "A man should tell the truth and speak
Mendacity in our Midst
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with kindness; he should not tell the truth unkindly, nor 
utter lies out of kindness. This is a constant duty" 
(4.138). While he presumes that it is not worthwhile to 
deal with the possibility of lies told unkindly, these 
statements come as close to universal statements one 
could expect from people writing in that social milieu.
These ancient Indian texts acknowledge that not all 
hes are morally equal. The seriousness of the crime (or 
sin) depended on the things about which the lie was told 
and the punishment depended not only on the thing lied 
about but also on the motivation for doing so. Since the 
intention to mislead is crucial in a lie, Gautama's ten 
circumstances where untruthfulness does not lead to a 
loss of caste are those that extenuate intentionality.
V. Negative Features of Ancient Indian Behaviour Codes
This essay is not an apology for ancient Indian codes. 
Its writing is motivated by the demand for being fair in 
appraising them. There is much in these codes that we 
would find unacceptable today. They have many 
unresolved inconsistencies both within and between the 
codes. Let us consider just a few of these that concern 
truthfulness and falsehood.
We have already seen in Table 3 the differences that 
exist in Gautama, in Vasistha and in Manu when it comes 
to determining the seriousness of a lie and the conditions 
that extenuate it. The contradictions exist not just 
between codes but within any one given text as well.
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Consider the five verses from Chapter 8 in Manu (Doniger, 
1991).
He kills the born and the unborn by lying 
about a matter that concerns gold, and he kills 
everything by lying about land; therefore you 
certainly should not lie about land (8.99). And 
they say that lying about water, about sexual 
union and the carnal enjoyment of women, 
about all jewels that are born in water or are 
made of stone, is like lying about land 
(8. 100).
But there is no crime in a (false) oath about 
women whom one desires, marriages, fodder 
for cows, fuel, and helping a priest (8.112).
For giving false evidence through naivete, a 
man should be fined just 100 pennies, if 
through greed, full two hundred, confusion,
250, if through fear, friendship or greed, a 
thousand, if through lust, 2500, and if through 
anger, he should be fined 3000 (8.120).
If one girl is shown but another is given to the 
bridegroom, he may marry both of them for 
the single bride price; that is what Manu says. 
(8.204).
In verse 8.100, he says that lying about sexual union 
and carnal enjoyment of women is very bad; in verse 
8.112, he says it is not a crime, but then in verse 8.120, 
he specifies a fine for false evidence given through lust. 
Similarly, in verse 8.112 he says false oaths about 
marriages do not constitute a crime, but then goes on to 
specify a resolution when one girl is shown and another 
given to the bridegroom.
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Some sutras call upon a witness to make a judgement 
on the moral worth of the accused in capital punishment 
cases. As we have seen, Gautama says that (Oliville, 
1999):
It is not an offence to give false testimony if a 
man's life depended on it (13.24), but not if it 
is the life of an evil man (13.25).
Apart from the context, punishments prescribed in 
the ancient behaviour codes were also dependent on the 
caste of the wrongdoer. So Manu advises "a just king 
should fine and banish the three classes if they give false 
evidence, but he should merely banish a priest (8.123)". 
Also, we would find unacceptable Manu's assertion that "if 
a witness who has testified (about a debt) is seen to 
experience a sickness, a fire, or a death in the family 
within seven days, he (the witness) must pay the debt and 
a fine (8.108)". Although we would consider Manu's faith 
in divine retribution an uncertain guide to judicial action 
today, the Indian disinclination to testify continues to 
this day. There are, of course, other reasons for this 
reluctance that have to do with the relative reaches of the 
state and the society.
Another limitation of the codes by Gautama, Vasistha 
and Manu, is that when they state the circumstances 
when a lie is not a crime, or not a sin, or does not entail 
a loss of caste, they leave open the specification of its 
seriousness, or of a punishment. Contrary to what Max
Dilip Ahuja
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MuUer asserted (p.60), there appears to be an insufficient 
sense of guilt arising from untruthful statements. 
Atonement for having told at least some lies is trivial 
(presumably in circumstances other than those for which a 
punishment was specified). Two examples will suffice. 
Gautama specifies the penance for telling a lie is 
austerities for a maximum of three days.
If someone uses abusive words, tells a lie, or 
inflicts an injury, he shall practice austerities 
for a maximum of three days (23.27).
It seems difficult to believe this is not a problem with 
the translation and the author is really recommending a 
minimum. Characteristically, Manu is even more 
understanding:
Even if a man is purified, after he has slept 
and sneezed, eaten and spat, told lies, drunk 
water, or prepared to recite the Veda, he 
should rinse his mouth (5.145).
VI. Context-free and Context-specific Systems
Despite its great facility in classifications, at some 
deeper level the Indian tradition has been distrustful of 
dichotomies or polar opposites. Apastamba recommends 
that the wandering ascetic should "abandon truth and 
falsehood, pleasure and pain, this world and next, and 
seek the Self (21.13)." For those of us not ready to
Mendacity in our Midst
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renounce the world yet, these categories continue to be of 
concern.
Ramanujan's achievement was to show that cultures 
have preferred modes of thinking and that in India 
context-specific modes were preferred over context-free 
systems. Cultures undergo much pain when they choose 
systems (or when these are imposed upon them) that are 
opposed to their natural inclination or when they 
continue to rely on systems long after they have ceased to 
be useful. The contractual demands of modern 
management, the demand (on grounds of fairness) for a 
uniform countrywide judicial system are instances of the 
need for context-free systems. It would be instructive to 
look at the characteristics of these systems before 
determining if a shift is desirable.
Table 4 summarizes the differences between the two 
modes on nine different criteria. Life is certainly too 
complex now to have lists (even with computers) that will 
be comprehensive enough to mandate appropriate 
behaviour for each occasion. The same complexity also 
ensures that situations will arise when universal laws will 
not be applicable. The risks of error in the two systems are 
also complementary: in one, we may tell a lie when truth 
may be desirable and in the other, we may tell the truth 
when something else may be desirable (e.g., silence, 
evasion, equivocation, kindness, etc.).
Context-specific systems can flourish in time-rich 
societies but make for enormous inefficiencies in time-
Dilip Ahuja .
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-Ĥ u  <v ro —’ »/) 00 c o> ro







13 QJ • > O) -M _C 
3  4-J 
OK -M
5  onO C  O
’ 7̂  Q- ™ Oi ^ o  





























3  CLjo o  
-g
'C  o .
ro3O"O)
1 - l  cn 2




















































o <L> a ; CTQ_ o>
OJ ,—










^  OO>> ■
-D
oO
















constrained modern societies. Moreover, while it does not 
have to be so, observational evidence seems to indicate 
that these societies greatly discount the residues left by 
past interpersonal transactions. (These societies also tend 
to be a-historical.) Treating each transaction afresh 
causes considerable unpredictability in outcomes, in their 
timing, or in both. Therefore, transaction costs are high. 
While in most instances in context-free systems, 
transaction costs will be low; they are extremely high 
when it comes to exceptions to the rules, for example the 
abortion debate in the United States.
Lapses in context-free systems seem also to be more 
characterized by guilt and worries about slippery slopes. If 
one allows dilution in some universal rule, one does not 
know where it will end. Context-specific systems on the 
contrary seem characterized by more effective 
compartmentali-zation, the same kind that permits 
simultaneous incompatible beliefs in cosmology and 
astrology. There are boundaries that most people will not 
cross, even if they are lax about breaking some rules. 
Context-specific systems also have the advantage of case- 
by-case approaches. Their judicial systems will appear to 
be fair if just reparation is assumed to have a higher value 
than equal punishment for the same crime and vice versa. 
Excessive reliance on context-specific systems, however, 
could lead to anarchy when every rule becomes 
negotiable. Hypocrisy is the danger of excessive reliance 
on context-free systems. When the rules are too rigid,
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people invariably find loopholes (Bok, 1999). Excessive 
reliance on each system gives rise to a longing for the 
other.
On balance, it would appear that the societal 
adaptations required to counter the unpredictability of 
outcomes greatly increase transactions costs, and 
modernizing context-specific cultures could derive 
considerable benefits from the more predictable outcomes 
of context-free systems. Nonetheless, there is nothing 
inherent in the nature of context-specific systems that 
justifies untruthful behaviour.
VII. Estimating the Prevalence of Untruthfulness
In conclusion, neither Ramanujan's assertions prove 
that Indians are untruthful, nor do Max Muller's tortuous 
efforts certify that we are truthful. No amount of quoting 
from the scriptures will settle this question, which cannot 
avoid being plagued by over-generalization. The empirical 
questions are - how much lying is there? Of what type? 
Under what circumstances? Are the different types 
increasing or decreasing? In which groups? Are these 
questions answerable with some certainty? Towards the 
end of his lecture, Max Muller said that he believed that 
"to appeal to international statistics would be a 
dangerous game". In fact, it seems that these questions 
can only be answered, and international comparisons 
made, statistically.
It is undoubtedly true that all societies could do with
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less untruthfulness. In Max Muller's lecture, one can detect 
a snide aside about his British hosts - "What would be 
falsehood or trickery in private life is honoured by the 
name of policy and diplomacy if successful against 
strangers". It is a truism that there is some partial truth in 
most prejudices, even in those quoted by Ramanujan and 
Max Muller. Many of us have encountered instances in 
urbanized India wherein lies are told about exceedingly 
trivial and inconsequential matters (for example, to control 
a child's behaviour, as excuses for being late, as a response 
to a request for directions, as a response to an invitation, 
etc.) where less deceitful responses could have been 
preferable.
We have also seen that strict compartmentalization 
helps maintain boundaries and these trivial lies do not 
extend easily to other misdemeanours. There are numerous 
anecdotal instances of verbal commitments being 
honoured in India even when large sums are at stake 
without written or enforceable contracts, something that 
rarely happens in context-free societies. As Sarukkai 
(1999) has written, "given the plethora of tiny lies we are 
embedded in, it is surprising that the'jump to more 
serious deception does not take place more routinely and 
as a matter of fact".
A beginning can be made by trying to estimate the 
prevalence of lying in different groups with the means of 
a carefully designed questionnaire. In order to minimize 
getting answers that the respondents will immediately
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figure out are expected of them (these antennae are 
extremely finely tuned in context-specific societies), the 
first investigations should deal with instances of petty 
untruthfulness, where the consequences of -the lie are 
trivial.
Neither context-specificity nor ancient behavior codes 
justifies untruthfulness today. To ferret out reasons for 
these behaviours is a second order empirical exercise. The 
alternatives provided in the questionnaire should help to 
seek out the reasons why such "tiny lies" are prevalent, 
what is it that the respondents are really trying to protect 
or optimise. Where questionnaires are not found to work, 
data obtained from actual experimental settings might 
provide the relevant estimates.
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